RESCUING SOLDIERS OF MISFORTUNE represents yrs as a military lawyer in prosecution & defense
This book, which represents years of research and experience serving as a military lawyer in both prosecution and defense....
WHY RESCUING SOLDIERS OF MISFORTUNE can
help elected officials, law enforcement, the legal system, and veterans’ advocates to develop relevant programs that do far more than simply warehouse some troublesome individuals.
https://www.facebook.com/rescuingsoldiers/ (From Preface)
Eventually, more than 90 percent of individuals, including incarcerated veterans, leave prison. However, if they do not have programs that are capable of meeting their needs while they are incarcerated, these returning convicts risk being recidivists and can cost their jurisdictions far more than what effective programming would have cost. Thus, this book provides ideas that public administrators and other leaders can use to strength- en the fabric of our society—often at a surprisingly low cost.
The approach in this book spans the post-World War I period to the pre- sent to show programs that promote successful readjustment from military service and treatment of combat and operational stress injuries during confine- ment. To strike a proper balance, the author also considers responses to the leading objections about veteran-specific interventions. At its core, this publication seeks to eliminate the guesswork from the formulation of responses to a special population. The aim is to identify responses that are verifiable and can be replicated by others.
One of the major challenges facing correctional institutions has been identification of inmates who are veterans. Because many veterans conceal their identities for fear of losing benefits or shame at the fact of arrest, the inability to quantify this group with any degree of certainty has traditionally limited options for addressing the problem of incarcerated veterans. Requests for military records could take months to obtain, if they were even available. Correctional administrators had to contend with the possibility that “fakers” would attempt to gain benefits if they offered programs without the capability of verifying veteran status.
In 1990, during congressional hearings on the readjustment and mental health needs of incarcerated veterans, J. Michael Quinlan, Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, emphasized the need for a system to conduct computer matching of inmates with databases at the Department of Veterans Affairs The hearings underscored the fact that it was difficult to identify veterans and their needs for veteran-specific services be- cause of the lack of methods to confirm the veteran status of inmates.
After decades of concern and confusion, as a part of the Department of Veterans Affairs (Veterans Administration) intensified outreach efforts, on April 25, 2012, personnel at the Homeless Program Office developed a com- puterized system to quickly scan their own systems for confirmation of vet- eran status. The program, called the Veterans Reentry Search Service requires only a Social Security number to access basic information about vet- erans’ military records. To protect the information, prison administrators ob- tain basic confirmation of veteran status while Veterans Administration per- sonnel simultaneously receive a more detailed output including the charac- ter of the veteran’s discharge and other facts about the nature of an inmate’s military service and experiences.
The Veterans Administration fielded the VRSS in the state correctional systems of California, Iowa, and Maryland to determine how accurately the system could account for veterans within the institutions. Surprisingly, while California prisons had estimated their veteran population at 2.7 percent based on inmate self-identification, the results of the VRSS computer matching revealed more than double the amount—roughly 7.9 percent (J. McGuire, personal communication, December 30, 2013). In California’s example, the computerized search identified more than 5,000 previously not accounted for veteran inmates.
In the Middlesex County House of Correction, use of VRSS revealed more than 50 incarcerated veterans when most thought only a handful existed. Identification of this substantial population led the sheriff to develop a support group, then a separate Housing Unit for Military Veterans (HUMV) dorm to respond to these inmates’ service-relat- ed needs. The VRSS program is now available in several correctional systems, and VA specialists have encouraged correc- tional professionals to use the system to provide services that will assist vet- erans in their readjustment to society.
While the VRSS program offers a relatively new capability for jails and prisons to identify veteran inmates, it poses a more daunting question—what do to with them once identified! Based on research on the topics of military service, combat, and criminal behavior, inevitably some portion of veterans in the offender population—perhaps quite small but still very significant— have dire needs to complete the process of readjusting to society after dis- charge from the military. Others—in another distinct subpopulation—have legitimate needs for treatment to address lingering operational stress injuries such as Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and mild Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI).
For these combat-traumatized veterans, especially, there is a lingering question of how suitable correctional facilities are to address their specific needs. While the VRSS program offers new ability to confirm inmates’ vet eran status, it does not provide any means for the Veterans Administration to overcome 38 C.F.R. § 17.38, a regulatory ban against offering any in- or outpatient medical treatment services to an inmate (Schaffer, 2016). Undoubtedly, with the use of the VRSS program, there will be new pressure on correctional professionals to address the population of “forgotten warriors” who occupy their cells and dorms, but there is little Veterans Administration corresponding assistance in addressing these inmates’ needs during the period of incarceration, aside from transitional planning for the period of reentry.
Excerpt from Preface by Evan Seamone
CHAPTER EXCERPT BELOW
1st comprehensive sourcebook of problems AND solutions that have followed many Veterans’ transitions from warriors to civilians in Criminal Justice-- from World War I to the Cold War, Iraq and Afghanistan.
"Major
Seamone is a unique expert with blended lived experience, practice experience,
and research knowledge. His book showcases his vast experience and knowledge
about veterans involved in the criminal justice system. Through in-depth case
examples, empirical data, and real-life stories, the book provides a rare
important informational guide on how we can better serve our nation's veterans."
Clinical
Psychologist, Department of Veterans Affairs
Associate
Professor of Psychiatry, Yale University
"Drawn from the wealth of Evan Seamone's professional endeavors in combination with his personal military experience this exploration and integration of topical research and commentary regarding justice involved veterans is remarkable. Through this Evan provides a practical guide to services, along with an understanding of policy and program issues in need of further consideration. He most certainly accomplishes his stated goal to "remove the veil of ignorance" (regarding these matters).
--Joel Rosenthal, Ph.D., Retired National Training Director, VA Veterans Justice Programs
"Drawn from the wealth of Evan Seamone's professional endeavors in combination with his personal military experience this exploration and integration of topical research and commentary regarding justice involved veterans is remarkable. Through this Evan provides a practical guide to services, along with an understanding of policy and program issues in need of further consideration. He most certainly accomplishes his stated goal to "remove the veil of ignorance" (regarding these matters).
--Joel Rosenthal, Ph.D., Retired National Training Director, VA Veterans Justice Programs
When Evan R. Seamone deployed as an Army lawyer in
Iraq (2005-6), he became concerned about veterans in the criminal justice
system after seeing many young soldiers facing harsh penalties because they
suffered mental health symptoms after dedicated service. Now working with
Harvard Law School’s Veterans Legal Clinic, Seamone helps obtain benefits for
veterans who have been entangled in the military and civilian legal
systems. He wrote RESCUING SOLDIERS OF MISFORTUNE: A Full Spectrum Approach to Veterans in
The Criminal Justice System from Arrest to Reentry (Charles C. Thomas Publishers-Dec 5th)
to acknowledge historical lessons vital for mental health professionals, law
enforcement, corrections, the courts, and anyone seeking to help veterans with
a range of solutions, especially for those in conflict with the law.
The book details common pathways to criminal
offending by military veterans, which may relate more to training and
conditioning than combat trauma. One
major contributor is the impact of the military’s warrior indoctrination
process. Basic training deliberately changes one’s values and perceptions in
major ways that cannot be reversed. There is also the military’s comprehensive
programs that provide soldiers with healthcare, housing expenses, and other living
costs. While they free their focus, young soldiers can also be deprived of the
opportunity to learn crucial skills, such as budgeting, needed to succeed in civilian
life.
Many young veterans are also impacted for
generations to come by the modern day “scarlet letter” of the
less-than-honorable discharge, characterizations that military members can receive
for acts of misconduct. Often these common offenses, that result in “bad paper”,
have no parallel in the civilian world. Seamone describes how a 19-year-old can
be deemed ineligible for medical care, though he suffers from horrible wounds
of war, and that his less-than-honorable discharge can place his family at risk
because of continual exposure to his untreated symptoms.
The book draws an important distinction between veterans
who face a heightened risk of engaging in violent behavior and criminal
involvement, and societal myths that portray significant populations of
veterans as diseased and prone to committing crimes. Contrary to the media-supported
Whacko-and Violent-Veteran models, the majority of veterans do not have mental
health disorders. Even among those who do, the vast majority do not commit violent
or other criminal offenses. The challenge is to address the small but still
significant population of veterans who face these overlapping difficulties.
RESCUING
SOLDIERS OF MISFORTUNE also relates solutions that are beneficial to
all involved. When VA programs are allowed in prisons or jails, law enforcement
benefits—even those who may not be veterans themselves. When police officers in
Chicago, some of whom were veterans, learned the symptoms of PTSD, they were
able to de-escalate both incidents in their own lives and encounters with
veterans in the community. In incarcerated settings, veterans bring attributes,
such as shouldering responsibility, following rules, loyalty to their group
first, and pride in a mission, that make targeted programming more effective
and safer. When incarcerated veterans are linked with community mentors, both the
veterans and the community benefit.
The tremendous effect of this partnership was
recognized after World War I, when the American Legion teamed with the Veterans
Bureau to identify incarcerated veterans throughout the nation and assist in
providing treatment instead of punishment. The theme continued during World War
II when the Indiana State Farm at Greencastle developed a program that matched
incarcerated veterans with mentors in the nearby community. And Veterans
Treatment Courts, which develop individualized
treatment plans to assist veterans in the community, have continued this best
practice of linking participants with mentors.
Seamone explains the how the tacit agreement between
the military and the public sector (the military fights war and civilian
society assumes the burden of reintegration) has broken down.. Too often, the military’s ambivalence to the
future treatment needs of young offenders creates major problems in society for
generations.Yet there are many ways the military could aid the veteran before
he leaves the base, such as suspending a “bad paper” discharge so benefits are
intact and allowing probation for military crimes. Civilian organizations also
need to be involved in the active duty stage. Because they have specialized
expertise in responding to veterans in the criminal justice system, a landslide
of negative consequences can be prevented.
RESCUING
SOLDIERS OF MISFORTUNE offers a complete range of
solutions for the treatment of veterans who are caught in the criminal justice
system. It details both the different pathways to criminal offenses by veterans
and specific solutions. It also explains how veterans involved in criminal
justice may be entitled to benefits they have never received. These resources
and tools can transform lives. The unique mission and duty of this book is to
integrate those who have served and given all to our nation. Though physically
back home, too many veterans are still fighting their wars.
This is an essential book for anyone who works with or for Veterans and civilians, who like me, are largely ignorant about the experience of Veterans. Their transition to civilian life is important to all of us, and communities can find ways to give back to those who gave so much.
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ISBN 978-0-398-09249-8
54.95 paper and ebook
December 5, 2018
Website: https://www.soldierrescue.com
FB: Rescuing Soldiers of Misfortune @soldierrescue.com
Order copy at: https://www.ccthomas.com/details.cfm?P_ISBN13=9780398092498
S.W.
VETERAN
CRIME WAVES, WHACKO-VETS, AND
OTHER
STEREOTYPES: THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN
MILITARY SERVICE AND CRIME
Renewed
Concern for Veteran Offenders
All
members of the uniformed services are trained to be warriors first,
even if
they have duties that may be comparable to the civilian sector
For
example, military lawyers, doctors, dentists, and psychiatrists,
who are
burdened with various professional duties, must still have
familiarity
with basic combat skills. Proficiency in soldier tasks and physical
conditioning
are nonnegotiable because these skilled personnel all wear the
same
uniform as an infantryman or woman when deployed, and enemy
forces do
not discriminate by occupational specialty in their attacks.
For years,
commentators have seized on this distinction and tried to de -
monstrate a
link between this basic duty description of waging war and criminal
offending
in society. The connection might seem appealing on its face
because no
other profession has a similar duty, not even those law enforcement
professionals
who are authorized to use force in certain limited situations.
In other
words, “[t]he only profession that explicitly trains its employees
to harm,
disable, and destroy another human being is the profession of the
warrior—the
soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine” (Moore et al., 2009, p. 307).
Researchers
have historically attempted to explain connections to criminal
offending
either with the “Violent Veteran” model, which attributes violent
crime to
military service in general, or the “whacko-vet” myth, which attributes
violent
crime to combat-traumatized service members. These models
are
important to explore because, while neither one is valid, politicians, the
media, and
veterans’ advocacy groups have interjected these models into the
discourse
on programs for criminally involved veteran offenders.
There
have been upticks in crime following most wars, in
most
countries, which has led many to question whether returning veterans
are
responsible for these results. Vietnam was the most evident one, with the
homicide
rate rising from 4.5 per 100,000 in 1963 to 9.3 per 100,000 in 1973
(Archer
& Gartner, 1984, p. 68). Accounting for scholars’ interest throughout
the
centuries, historians Dane Archer and Rosemary Gartner offered up the
theoretical
“Violent Veteran” model as one of many possible explanations.
This model
states that “the experience of war resocializes soldiers to be more ac -
cepting of
violence and more proficient at it” Over the years, the media’s interest in
veteran offending has provided support for the theory by raising the public
consciousness of veteran offenders. In the 1920s, following World War I,
newspapers frequently portrayed
veterans as
a criminal class, with headlines such as “Ex-Soldier Kills Wife
and Self,”
“Vet Loots Till,” “Homestead Hotel Man Slain; War Veteran
Blamed
After Firing Shots into own Body”.
illustrator
Bill Mauldin created a comic illustration to criticize the manner in
which the
media presented a misleading picture of veteran criminality through
overreporting.
The scene depicted a husband and wife sitting on the living
room couch
reading a newspaper appropriately titled The
Daily Dirt. Large
headlines
indicated, “Veteran Kicks Aunt,” “Combat Veteran Argues with
Cop,” and
“Jealous Vet Sees Judge.” The wife notes with interest, “There’s a
small item
on page 17 about a triple ax murder. No veterans involved”
(Mauldin,
1947).
In his
book, Back Home, Mauldin
observed how “CRAZED VET RUN
AMOK”
headlines “gave added impetus to the rumor that always appeared
in every
country after war—that the returning soldiers are trained in killing
and assault
and are potential menaces to society” (1947, p. 55). His criticisms
echo
concerns over the manner in which the media portrayed Vietnam veterans
as ticking
“time bombs” waiting to explode in violence at the slightest
provocation
(Burkett & Whitley, 1998, p.150). Some have argued that similar
sensationalism
exists in coverage of homicides committed by Iraq and
Afghanistan
war veterans (Holbrook & Anderson, 2011) or exaggerations of
the number
of “unstable” violent veterans returning from those wars (Moore
et al.,
2009, p. 312).
Despite
anecdotal support for the violent veteran theory, Archer and
Gartner’s
very careful research concluded that it was completely insufficient,
and that
large-scale crime waves following most wars are more likely attributable
to poor
economic conditions and other social forces, rather than the
behaviors
of ex-service members. Contrary to the violent veteran model, re -
search has shown that military service actually reduces
overall rates of crime,
the most
likely to commit violent offenses, the military, by recruiting from
the same
at-risk population, is credited with providing a more constructive
outlet.
Professor Ivan Y. Sun and his colleagues conclude that military service
has a
distinctive crime-prevention role, in which the Armed Forces minimize
social
“strain by providing many young individuals an opportunity to
achieve
self-sufficiency and other social values and goals, which in turn make
crime
involvement or the seeking of illegitimate means unattractive”
Because the
violent veteran model focuses on military service in general,
a
permutation of it suggests that combat is the
crucial factor. In other words,
because
even the strongest soldier will reach a breaking point in sustained
combat
operations (Gabriel, 1987, p. 4; Blum, 2017), exposure to combat
conditions
transforms the veterans and make them more likely to offend
once back
in civilian society. Research has similarly debunked this permutation
of the
violent veteran model. Even though combat veterans frequently
experience
significant and life-altering negative experiences, the vast “ma -
jority of
warriors return from the battlefield, resume normal lives, adjust, and
often succeed
better than their non-serving peers and are never unusually
violent”
(Moore et al., 2009, p. 314).
2.
The Whacko-Vet Myth
Commentators
have offered the whacko-vet myth as an explanation for
criminal
offending in the community, attributing violent crimes to war-traumatized
veterans
whose training in the art of war makes them a particularly
high risk
to the community upon the activation of stress triggers. In the context
of
interpersonal violence, the myth claims “that having been in combat
turns a man
into a woman or child beater” (Matsakis, 2007, p. 235). This
belief may
stem from an incident in 1949, when a World War II veteran with
sniper
training reportedly “snapped” and went on a shooting spree with a
souvenir
pistol killing twelve victims in Camden, New Jersey (Archer &
Gartner,
1984, p. 75).
Based on
fears like these in the aftermath of World War II, some influential
New York
socialites argued for special “identification patches” to designate
veterans in
public and pushed for their isolation at “reorientation
camps”
where they could be deprogrammed for the safety of the community
(Bourke,
1999, p. 352). As in the case of the “violent veteran” model,
media
portrayals also fueled the myth, especially fictional stories such as
World War
II era soap operas that depicted veterans as “perhaps the greatest
threat
domestically” because many “returned from the war stripped of all
social restraints” (Shuker-Haines, 1995, p. 157).
Later, following Vietnam, a
commentator
noted the “Kojack Syndrome” in which television plots routinely
concluded,
“If there is a bizarre crime, check out all the recently discharged
Vietnam
veterans” (Camacho, 1980, p. 270). He examined the TV
Guide listings and cited the following
entry from 1975 as a representative
example of
recurring weekly programming: “A psychotic Vietnam veteran is
terrorizing
hostages in a remote island hotel” (Camacho, 1980, p. 270).
The major
problem with any stereotypes is that they usually hold some
small
element of truth, even though the ultimate assertion is a baseless
generalization.
The
whacko-vet myth is such a stereotype. The partial truth is
that some
portion of veterans who return from combat are forever transformed
by the
experience, and, among them, some will experience symptoms
that
contribute to or cause them to behave in a manner that is both
symptomatic
of their mental condition and criminal (Seamone et al., 2014;
Seamone et
al., 2018a). Inevitably, some combat veterans will engage in such
extreme
violence as a result of their illness that they will be sentenced to
death for
capital crimes (Wortzel & Arciniegas, 2010).
In fact,
for some combat-traumatized
veterans, criminal offending will
necessarily
be a form of readjustment to civilian society (Brown, 2010; Sea -
mone, 2011;
Seamone, 2013a). As Veterans Administration clinicians Bruce
Pentland
and James Dwyer observed early on, some “Viet Nam veterans
come home
via criminal behavior and incarceration” (1985, p. 405). The
problem
with the whacko-vet myth is the exaggeration in which all is substituted
for some. Persons with mental
illnesses—across the board—are unfairly
stigmatized
as being more dangerous and violent simply because of their
mental
condition.
Ultimately,
mental illness, alone, does not increase the risk of violence
(Elbogen
& Johnson, 2009). Simply having PTSD or another combat-related
condition
does not make a veteran more likely to be violent. Nor does combat
experience
predispose veterans to become more physically abusive to
their
spouse and/or children. Compared to the population, veterans are less
likely to
commit criminal offenses than members of the civilian community.
Veterans in
prisons and jails are not exclusively combat veterans. Con sid -
ering the
estimates of significant numbers of Vietnam veterans and Iraq and
Afghanistan
veterans who suffer from PTSD, it remains the case that these
veterans,
even with mental illness, are not only largely capable of, but largely
successful
at, regulating their behavioral impulses.
The
Problem of Unwarranted
Assumptions
and Associational Leaps
The
whacko-vet myth suffers from the inability to distinguish risk factors
from actual mental states: “It is overly simplistic to
say that a veteran with
PTSD is at
risk for violence despite PTSD being a validated risk factor”
(Elbogen et
al., 2010, p. 601). Combat veterans, especially those who have
killed in
combat (Maguen et al., 2012) or experienced events that challenged
their
deeply-held moral beliefs (Litz et al., 2009), are at greater risk of
developing
PTSD and
combat and operational stress injuries that could potentially
result in
violent symptoms. However, this hardly explains all combat
experiences.
The jump from combat trauma to violent or criminal acts skips
several
steps that could be affected by a wide range of variables.
Criminologists
and psychologists suggest at least five major considerations
that
severely limit the association:
1. Personal Thresholds. Not all
individuals will develop the same mental
con ditions
based on similar traumatic combat experiences. If individuals
have
experienced prior trauma or other adversity, they might be more vulnerable
to the
types of symptoms that commonly result in violence (Matsakis,
2007).
However, a number of protective factors mitigate the risk, such as
one’s level
of social support.
2. Trauma Types. Some types of combat experiences
are more likely to re -
sult in
violent behaviors than others. For example, individuals whose PTSD
resulted
from the loss of someone close to them in combat are less likely to
engage in
aggressive behaviors. Contrarily, “specific combat-related variables,
such as
atrocities exposure . . . and perceived threat during war service
. . .
predict violence, rather than general combat exposure itself”
(Elbogen et
al., 2010, p. 598). Thus, the nature of combat trauma is often
context-specific
and cannot be generalized to an entire population.
3. Symptoms of Anger Do Not Automatically Equate to
Symptoms of Aggression.
PTSD is a
mental condition with symptoms that often result in anger. Sim -
ilarly, the
veteran will often experience anger in response to other combat
and
operational stress injuries related to guilt and shame because the state
of rage
helps to provide a temporary sense of control. Importantly, anger
does not
automatically lead to aggression, which is a behavior rather than a
feeling:
“It is possible to be angry without becoming verbally or physically
violent”
(Matsakis, 2007, p. 191).
4. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Other Mental Health Conditions
Are Often
Temporary. Some say that individuals with
combat trauma are forever transformed
by their
experiences. This may lead to adjustment difficulties where
they will
need to learn how to adjust their experience of symptoms like a
dial,
rather than an off-switch (Hoge, 2010). But, it is misleading to believe
that all
invisible injuries from combat are permanent. Recovery from PTSD
is
possible. In many cases, the condition will resolve over time, even without
treatment
from a clinician. Effective evidence-based treatments, such as cognitive-
behavioral therapies and exposure therapies can assist
the great major
ity of
veterans in their recovery even when conditions persist. Generally,
complete
remission occurs in approximately 30 to 50 percent of the in stances
of PTSD
(Seamone, 2012, p. 322). Granted PTSD can become chronic in
another 10
percent who will “never recover” (Seamone, 2012, p. 322). How -
ever,
symptoms should never be assumed consistent and permanent in the
entire
population of combat-traumatized veterans. The myth of the whackovet
entirely
ignores the potential for recovery.
5. Violence Often Results from the Combination of PTSD
Symptoms with Other
Psychosocial Factors. In many
cases, combat trauma alone is not responsible
for violence,
but rather becomes amplified by conditions such as unemployment
and
homelessness. Without these different aggravating factors, the
veteran
might not offend, even in the face of significant symptoms (Olusay -
naya, 2012,
p. 692).
While the
five reasons above describe severe limitations to the whackovet
myth, there
are additional ones. Ultimately, each offender’s behavior necessarily
depends on
the individual’s specific combat experiences and personal
history,
making it difficult to draw connections between combat trauma
and
offending. In a study, international researchers highlighted three reasons
why there
is not yet a reliable model of the relationship, including the
failure of
corrections systems to account for veteran status and inconstancies
in application
of diagnostic criteria (Taylor, Parkes, Haw, & Jepson, 2012).
Other
researchers have rejected the possibility of research links between
PTSD and
violence committed by veterans based on the “complex number
of pathways
to violence” (Grieger, Benedek, & Ursano, 2011, p. 208). The
section
below describes how, in debunking the violent veteran and whackovet
myths,
other commentators have spawned new myths, on the opposite
end of the
spectrum.
Mythology
Among Those Defending Veterans’ Honor
The
sections above highlight the weaknesses of common attempts to connect
criminal
offending to veteran status or combat trauma. Although the
media has
portrayed these connections and anecdotal cases might lend support,
we cannot
conclude that serving in the military or experiencing combat
trauma
necessarily makes a given veteran more likely to commit a criminal
or violent
act. The violent veteran and whacko-vet theories are myths as
applied to
veterans at large. These popular theories, however, have contributed
to a larger
fable that is far more devastating than unfair prejudice
and an
assault on the pride of the veteran who has peacefully adjusted following
service:
Based on the fact that veteran status and combat trauma do
not automatically lead to offending, other commentatnumber
of veteran offenders is too small to matter on a grand scale and that those
veterans who do offend engage in criminal behavior based on factors unrelated
to the military.
The
Myth of Insignificance
According
to researcher Myra MacPherson, a major reason explaining
a lack of
interest in incarcerated veterans is a commonly held position that
incarcerated
veterans constitute so “miniscule” and “insignificant” a population
that they
do not matter (1992, pp. 582–583). This theory contends, it is
an insult
to the vast majority of law-abiding veterans to focus attention on
the smaller
population. This theory distorts the other myths by suggesting
that any shift in focus to veteran
offenders unfairly promotes the myth of the
whacko- or
violent vet and further confirms the exaggerated media portrayals
that
pervade society (McCormick-Goodhart, 2013). This was a way in which
conservative
veterans from the “greatest generation” and prior wars were
able to
distance themselves from Vietnam veterans, whom they believed would
tarnish
their reputations through associations as veterans (MacPherson,
1992).
The
position permeates literature on veteran offenders even today,
with
authors adopting an apologetic stance when discussing these issues—if
they dare.
As Clive Emsley explains, “there can be hostility to anyone who
addresses
criminal offenses by service personnel, even in a serious academic
fashion”
(2013, p. 6). He offers the following simple reason.
In an
environment of concern over media portrayals of Iraq and Afghanistan
War
veterans, some may inevitably criticize any concern over veteran criminality
as an
overexaggeration.
The
“Bad Apple” Myth
Separate
from the idea that attention would unfairly magnify a small population
of
offenders, another reason some may be ambivalent to the plight
of the
incarcerated veteran is the notion that the offender was already prone
to crime
prior to entry into the military. There is certainly evidence that a
number of
recruits engaged in criminal behavior prior to entering the mili-ors may assume
that the tary. Some came to the military under a program of moral waivers,
which
relaxed
eligibility standards prior to the economic crisis when recruiters had
trouble
meeting their benchmarks (Alvarez, 2007).
Other studies
reveal recruits who admitted that they had engaged in
attempted
or completed rape or sexual assault prior to their entry into the
service.
One revealed that 12 percent of Navy recruits in a sample admitted
to
committing a completed rape, while 3 percent admitted to perpetrating
an
attempted rape (Stander, Merrill, & Thomsen, 2008, p. 9). In other in -
stances,
members of gangs and child predators may purposely join the military
for easier
access to money or victims. In fact, very recently, researchers
have
developed actuarial models to predict which recruits are at risk of committing
“non-familial
major physical violent crime perpetration” (Rosellini et
al., 2016),
and “sexual assault perpetration” (Rosellini et al., 2017). These
predictions
have been based upon “administrative data,” such as prior
behavioral
problems (Rosellini et al., 2016, p. 662).
While
elevated risk suggests the need for preventive measures, none of
these facts
support the generalization that all veteran offending is attributable
to factors
unrelated to the military. Instead, there are varied reports of military
veterans
entering the criminal justice system as first-time offenders following
their
discharge or return from a deployment. Additionally, statistics
suggest
that military members are more likely to be first-time offenders than
the general
population (Bronson et al., 2015; Noonan & Mumola, 2007).
In 1975,
the president of a court-martial panel shared this view, which
explained
the military jury’s own collective opinion of how the military can
uniquely
contribute to mental conditions that result in criminal offending.
After
commenting on the convicted airman’s absence of a prior record and
clean
upbringing, the major explained: “I felt strongly, and still do, that the
military
environment in South East Asia brought about Airman McBride’s
change of
attitude, and that the Air Force was therefore at least partially ob -
ligated to
provide him medical or psychiatric treatment” (United States v.
McBride, 1975, p. 134, app. A). These
comments represent the experiences
of a great
many justice-involved veterans.
Chapter 4,
in fact, describes the military’s own recognition of how combat
stress can
directly result in mental health disorders and offenses falling
under the
umbrella of “misconduct stress behaviors.” Perhaps former Chair -
man of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, put it best in a letter
to the
Secretary of Veterans Affairs: “Many of our returning veterans and
service
members experience life-changing events, some of which may cause
them to
react in adverse ways and get in trouble with the law” (Mullen, 2011,
p. 1).
Accordingly, while the barrel of offenders may include a number
of bad apples, these spoils hardly account for all
violent offenders.
In
recognizing both extremes of the whacko- and violent vet myths on
the one
hand, and the insignificant and bad-apple vet myths on the other, it
is vital to
remember that legitimate connections between combat trauma
and
offending inevitably do exist among some portion of veterans, even if
that subset
is much smaller than the entire veteran population. Some combat-
traumatized
veterans will be at greater risk of offending based on particular
experiences.
To entirely ignore factors that would help distinguish
between
myth and realty in this most important area is not only illogical, but
dangerous
for the veterans who are truly at greatest risk of reoffending without
intervention.
Not only are they at risk, but so are their families and communities.
The
following chapter thus illustrates the manner in which military
service and
combat influences that smaller subset of veterans for whom there
is a connection to their criminal offending.
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